23 de agosto de 2019
El martes 3 de setiembre, a la 1 pm, en la Sala de Consejo de Estudios Generales Letras de la PUCP, el profesor Miguel Ángel Sebastián, del Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas de la UNAM, ofrecerá la conferencia titulada «La representación de la primera persona en la experiencia». Los comentarios estarán a cargo de Marlon Rivas, del Grupo Interdisciplinario de Investigación Mente y Lenguaje. El ingreso es libre.
It is commonly assumed that undergoing a conscious experience is just a matter of being in a particular kind of state, where the notion of state is broadly understood as to make room for dynamic processes. We can call these particular kinds of states ‘Phenomenally Conscious States (PCSs). So, the property of undergoing experience E just is the property of being in a PCS. A theory of consciousness should then provide an account of the kind of property or properties that individuates PCSs, distinguishing them from other kind of states, in order to have a characterization of the experience. In this paper I will argue that the subject is represented in all experiences, in a way that is not represented in unconscious representations. This view contrasts with the view according to which it is the experience itself that is represented in all experiences. The view I shall recommend is consistent with the phenomenological observation and makes justice to the perspectival nature of experience, it responds to Hume’s famous objection from introspection, and it does not over-intellectualize experiences.